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Reflections Upon Hegel's Concept of Property,
Contract, Punishment, and Constitutional Law
Morris D. Forkosch*
Professor Forkosch here examines Hegelian theories of justice and
law in the belief that Hegel's theories are helpful in understanding
legal concepts today. Hegel's philosophy in general is first discussed
as a background for the author's subsequent discussion of Hegel's legal
theories.

Codification and re-codification in federal and state jurisdictions
has proceeded in a geometrical progression these past decades. To
what extent is the old law yielding or, au contraire, to what extent
is the ancient law reappearing? For example, are Plato's views on
crime and punishment being revived, continued, or changed?' Or,
to what extent are Hegel's views in a certain few legal areas of present
interest and value? As we shall see, an understanding of Hegel's jurisprudential views, 2 as related to specific topics, is a present-day pragmatic necessity. We propose to seek these views, albeit briefly, in the
fields of property, contract, punishment, and constitutional law.
Hegel's political philosophy is abstruse 3 and his jurisprudence is,
unfortunately, esoteric.4 As a part of his totally "false and wicked
7
6
doctrine,"5 his legal philosophy has been summarily rejected, ignored,
8
or little discussed by legal scholars. Obscure and misunderstood,
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See, e.g., Shuchman, Comments on the Criminal Code of Plato's Laws, 24 J.
HISTORY OF IDEAS, 25, 40 (1963), discussing the Platonic theories (in the REPUBLIC)
and practice (in the LAws), and concluding that insofar as this portion of the LAws
is concerned, Plato sought to "bridge the gap between his own socio-ethical theorizing

and the immediate realities of Greek law and the ethical theories implicitly embodied
therein."
2. See, e.g., Viereek, The Revolution in Values: Roots of the European Catastrophe,
1870-1952, 67 POL. Scr. Q. 339 (1952); Melvin, The Legal Norm in Secret Jurisprudence, 25 PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF TE AmcAN PHLosopHy Ass'N, 42
(1952).
3. Commins & Linscott, Preface, "Hegers Philosophy of Right," in III Wonimn's

GREAT TmNms 404 (1947).
4. I STmLING, Tim SE REr OF HEGEL xi (1865).

5. HOBHOUSE, THE M TAPIYSIcAL THEORY OF E STATE 6 (1918).
6. Ibid. Professor Hobhouse rejects all of Hegel's social and political philosophy.
7. As an example of "ignored," see HALL, READINGS IN JUISPRUDEN E (1938);
1 SiR mAN, RomAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 302-36 (1924);
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 100-06 (1923).

8. For "little discussed" see CAms, LEGAL PmiosoPBn

see also POUND,

FRoM PLATO TO HEGEL
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necessary and required to round out his entire system, 9 it is here felt
that Hegels theories of justice and law are today aidful in understand-

ing the legal concepts investigated. Before examining this portion,
however, it is required that the whole of Hegel be somewhat understood.
I. Tnx HiEGELIAN SYsTEm

The "only complete, matured, and authentic statement of Hegel's

philosophical system" 10 is to be found in his Encyclopaedia of the

Philosophical Sciences." This work investigates12 the "idea," i.e., all

reality, and this all-embracing idea (Hegers God?) is divided into

logic, nature, and spirit (or mind);

3

the last is subdivided into sub-

(1949), with one chapter of fifteen being devoted to Hegel. This is not to decry
the discussion which is excellent and an outstanding condensation. One criticism must
be made. There is preliminary acknowledgement that Hegel's thoughts are so
interconnected that the latter's jurisprudence cannot be understood in isolation from
his system. CAnus, op. cit. supra at 504. This is the prevailing view. Notwithstanding,
Cairns feels that it is "possible to comprehend Hegel's philosophy of law without a
preliminary excursus on his general system .... " At p. 505 he cites Sandars, Hegel's
Philosophy of Right, OXFORD EssAYs 213, 216 (1855), as authority for this view, but
Sandars' words are that "We need not travel beyond the limits of this particular
sphere in order to apprehend its true character."
There is a definite distinction between "apprehend" and "comprehend," and
WE.BSTE, DICTONARY 111, 459 (1931), defines these terms differently. Sandars limited
his term, whereas Cairns enlarges it. See also HEGEL, THE PHmOSOPHY OF BIGHT
(Dyde transl. 1896); CHANG, THE DEVELOPMENT, SIGNIFICANCE, AND SONE LMITATIONs ON HEGEL'S ErCAL TEACINc 48f (1926); MoRRuS, HEGEL'S Pimnosoplly OF
T
HISTORY AND OF HISTORY 2 (1887); HEGEL, LOGIC 28f. If we adopt the necessarily

"whole" or "integrated" approach, then Cairns' views are incorrect. CAIRNs, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 505.
9. See note 8 supra.
10. WALLACE, THE LOGIC OF HEGEL iX (2d ed. 1892) [hereinafter cited as WALLACE,
LoGic].
MAncusE, REASON AND REVOLUTION 62 (1941), speaks of Hegel's "First System"
as evolving from his University of Jena lectures between 1802 and 1806, i.e., the

"Jenenser system" of logic, metaphysic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of mind.
The early Jenenser system is not to be confused with the later Encyclopaedia.
11. Not completely translated into English, although Wallace has so done for the
first (Logic) and third (Geist) portion of the Encyclopaedia. See note 13 infra.
This volume is the third of Hegers four works published during his life. In 1807 came
his Die Phaenomenologie Des Geistes (Phenomenology of Mind); in 1812 came
the first part of his Wissenschaft der Logik (Science of Logic), in 1813 the second
part, both being combined in volume one, while in 1816 his second volume completed
the Science of Logic; in 1817 the first edition of his Encyclopaedic der Philosophisehen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences
in Outline) appeared (second edition in 1827, third edition in 1830); and his
final publication is the 1821 outlines of his Grundlinden der Philosophic des
Rechts (Philosophy of Right). HEGEL, THE PHLosoPHY oF EiGHT v (Knox transl.
1942), states 1821 is the correct date; WALLACE, LOGIC gives 1820, as does LomVENBERG, HEGEL-STCTION X (1929), as well as do others.
x'12. Not fully, for its title-page states it is an outline only and is to act primarily
as a manual for Hegel's students. WALLACE, LOGIC at ix.

13. The idea is divided into the idea in itself, or the logical idea, the idea outside
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jective, objective, and absolute spirit. The Philosophy of Right,14
which gives us Hegel's theory of law, treats of the second, or objective,
spirit.15 We propose first to analyze the Encyclopaedia,thereby setting
the philosophical stage for the introduction of Hegers jurisprudence,
and then to examine his legal approach in detail. The Encyclopaedia
presents a self-contained 16 system which proceeds from the abstract
17
to the concrete.
The first of the three Encyclopaedia divisions is logic, which "is the
real foundation of the Hegelian philosophy. Its aim is the systematic
reorganization of the commonwealth of thought." 18 The Logic, in
accordance with the scheme adopted, begins with the most abstract
and contentious of all thoughts, the concept of being. But a concept
alone is insufficient. It therefore necessitates the utilization of a
method whereby the truth may be reached. This method is termed
mediation. Thus, writes Hegel, "The truth is the whole. The whole,
however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness
through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must
be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what
it is in very truth . . .. Should it appear contradictory to say that
the absolute has to be conceived essentially as a result" this is not so.
For at the outset of our thinking do we not use universals, e.g., all
animals, but is this zoology? So, words like absolute, divine, and
eternal do not express what is implied in them; "and only mere words
like these, in point of fact, express intuition as the immediate. Whatever is more than a word like that, even the mere transition to a
proposition, is a form of mediation, contains a process towards another
state from which we must return once more. " 19 In other words,
itself, or nature, and the idea in and for itself, or spirit. CAIRNs, op. cit. supra note
8, at 504 n.3, calls this division logic, nature, and mind. He cites Wallace's translation
of the Geist, see note 11 supra, as Hegel's PmLosoprry OF Mum, but we shall speak
of it as the PHm.osoPHY OF SPRr, since Wallace himself confesses that "it may be
said the term mind is wretchedly inadequate and common-place, and that the better
rendering of the title would be PHmLOsOPHY OF Spmrr." HEGEL, THE PHMosoFHY OF
MND 37 (Wallace transl. 1894).
14. Translations by Knox (1942) and Dyde, op. cit. supra note 8; the former is
preferred since he gives us the 1821, see note 11 supra, work plus Hegel's own
explanatory notes, plus "Additions" which Hegels "official" biographer, E. Gans, culled
from his notes taken at Hegel's lectures [references to the Knox Translation hereinafter
cited as "PR" followed by page numeral].
15. STACE, THE PHnLosopHy OF HEGFL 526 (1924)

gives a chart which indicates

the placement of the various divisions and subdivisions of which we speak.
16. REYBURN, THE ETmcAL THEORY OF HEGEL xii (1921).
17. Momus, op. cit. supranote 8, at 3.
18. WALLACE, LOGIC at xiv; see also BAILLiE, THE ORiGIN AND SiGNiFICANGC OF
HEca's LoGIC x (1901). Wallace gives a structural break-down of the three ENCYCLOPAEui editions at xv, xviii, and xxiii.
19. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF Mn 82 (2d ed. Baillie transl. 1961). "It is
this process of mediation, however, that is rejected with horror, as if absolute
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Hegel's post-Kantianism invokes a transcendentalism which goes beyond that of his predecessor and reaches into an Absolute, with mediation being the method whereby this is achieved. And, as he then
states, "mediating is nothing but self-identity working itself out
through an active self-directed process; or, in other words, it is reflection into self, the aspect in which the ego is for itself, objective to
itself. It is pure negativity, or, reduced to its utmost abstraction, the
process of bare and simple becoming."
It is not difficult to see, in these quotations, the famous dialectic
which Hegel (and later Marx) used, that is, the negating of assumptions so as to produce a higher level of understanding,2" and shortly
we return to it. But for the present Hegel's Logic, which uses this
mediating method, concludes with the Idea, that is, an absolute selfconsciousness which is the thought in which all other thoughts are
included. 21 To these concepts of mediation and dialectics, which are
only means to the ultimate end (the Absolute Idea), there is 22now
added reason. Reason is purposive activity and is everything. It
is the generating force (the "will") which, using the method of
mediation, will ultimately reach the Idea. Dialectically it negates,
that is, it reaches into itself and abstracts from its real nature, thereby
objectifying itself. In other words, the self-consciousness (see fourth
previous sentence) becomes conscious of itself (wills itself) on its own
purposive account (ffir sich zu sein), z3 Thus universality and objectivity become (are) identical, and the objective spirit is founded
knowledge were being surrendered when more is made of mediation than merely the
assertion that it is nothing absolute, and does not exist in Absolute." Ibid.
Since Hegel's interpreters are numerous as the leaves in a forest, the definition of
his Absolute is uncertain. See, e.g., HALDAR, NEo-HEcELANiSm 438-85 (1927),
disclosing the view that Hegel's "Absolute is not a unitary self, but a self-conscious unity
of many selves." Id. at vii.
20. The dialectic is not original with Hegel, as he admits, but be refines it and
brings it to an apogee. Commins & Linscott, supra note 3, discuss this. It may be
parenthetically here queried whether our adversary system of law is not also a
dialectical seeking after truth.
21. MoRRs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 3; see also WALLACF, LocIC 132f; MAncus,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 62; JOAD, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PrmosoPHy 40 (1924).
While all this may sound as if Hegel omitted (or rejected) the practical world of
life, the inference is fallacious. He felt that while each was a synthesis they were yet
inadequate by themselves, that they were in constant contradiction, and that only
the Absolute Idea, as the Rational Comprehension which in its reality encounters only
itself, was ultimately Being or All Truth. HEGEL, Frost PNCnLE: Ax ExPosrIoN
OF COMpREHENSiON AND IDEA 30-31 (Harris transl. 1869). On the mediation-negation
concepts see also Id. at 8-10. And see also note 40 infra, as well as ORYNSKi, HEGEL
3 (1960), that his Phenomenology "constitutes a systematic survey of the ways in
which experience appears."
22. See HEGEL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 83; III ERnDmAN, A HISTORY OF PHmOSOriY
681 (Hough transl. 1893). "Self-consciousness . . . is Reason, which as such an
identity is not only the absolute substance but the truth that knows it . . . . Truth,
aware of what it is, is mind (spirity)." HEGEL, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 205.
23. HEGEL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 82-84, 218-20.
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upon the will's reasoned and purposive activity. "Institutions are the
work of the will putting itself forth into the world, moulding the
crude material of the world into a new world of mind."24 And this
freely acting will, as shortly can be seen, may well be termed the
sufficient cause for the Hegelian system.
Hegels introduction to his Logic rejects as incomplete the statement
incorrectly attributed to Aristotle, Nihil est in intellectu quod non
fuefit in sensu (There is nothing in thought which has not been in
sense and experience), and proposes that the other coin-face be
added, namely, Nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu.25 The
point of departure is thus conceded to be experience, which includes
one's immediate consciousness and the inductions therefrom.
"Awakened, as it were, by this stimulus, thought is vitally characterized by raising itself above the natural state of mind, above the sense
and the inferences from the senses into its own unadulterated element,
and by assuming, accordingly, at first a stand-aloof and negative attitude towards the point from which it started."26 This aloofness, as was
seen above, is really a state of antagonism to the sense-phenomena,
a willed negative approach to the originating point, but still incapable
of separation therefrom. It is through this continuing negating method
that ultimately we reach, through such an inward, and yet outward,
is the Absolute or God, and which may be
ladder, the Idea, which
27
more or less abstract.
Here is the negative28 dialectic utilized at the very inception of
Hegel's opening sentences and preliminary to the further exposition of
his system. This logical process provides the necessary understanding
29
for Hegel's approach, methodology, exposition, and conclusions.
Existence is thus negation and there can be no affirmation without a
necessary and correlative negation. Truth, i.e., the Idea, is reached
in and through30 this process. 31 Inherent in this logical approach is
24. STACE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 375; see also STIRLING, LEcTURES ON TH
Prmosopiry OF LAW 28 (1873); WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 485-86.
25. WALLACE, LOGIC 15. Hegel's indebtedness to his predecessors is not unacknowledged by him or by others, e.g., MuRn, AN INTRODUCTION TO IIEGEL xi (1940);
see also STACE, op. cit. supranote 15 passim.

26. HECEL, LOGIC 19; see also Harris' translation of Hegers Phenomenology in
op. cit. supra note 11, at 68-79.
27. HEGEL, LOGIC 19; see also MARcusE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 64.
28. See, e.g., MAEcusE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 123; see also GRAY, HEco's
HELLENIC IDEAL 74f (1941); Watson, The Problem of Hegel, 3 PHILOSOpImCAL REV.
546-67 (1894).
29. HEGEL, LOGIC 22; MAncusE, op. cit. supranote 10, at 64.
30. The statement "in and through" implies that a self-unfolding from within
LowENBanE,

occurs, so that it is not an external force which acts upon, but rather the thing, the

concept, or notion, or being, which itself unfolds by virtue of its inner contradictions,
the Idea being the ultimate realization.
31. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC, quoted in MARCUsE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 123f,
147.
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that same negation which is found in all other aspects of the entire
system.32 But basic to an understanding of any isolated portion of
the system is "the nature of speculative knowing [expounded] in my
Science of Logic, [and] in this manual [Philosophy of Right] I have
only added an explanatory note here and there about procedure and
method."3
Space limitations preclude further inquiry into the Logic but one
additional comment is advisable. Hegel has been accused of favoring
existing institutions because of his famous couplet, "What is rational
is real, and what is real is rational."34 There is agreement with the
indictment but not with the proof, for Hegel cannot be so translated.
What he did say is, "What is rational is actual, and what is actual is
rational,"5 and in section 6 of his Encyclopaedia he further explains
and defends this latter belief. Hegers German term is wirklich, not
real, and there is a sharp distinction between the two. The former
is translatable into the English "actual," and the latter into "real." In
translating and understanding wirklich we obtain a synthesis of
essence and existence. 36 It is this logical synthesis which, according
to Hegel, gives us the rational. For it is through freedom of thought,
i.e., rational thought,37 that we attain the Idea, and Hegel's philosophy
thus shows that "nothing is actual except the Idea."38 It is therefore
the synthesis of essence and existence which is rational actuality, not
per se that which is "real" to us;39 or, as the Logic puts it, the world
is "totality in itself, and contains the pure idea of truth itself"40 in its
41
unfoldingness.
The second of Hegers tripartite division of the Idea, i.e., nature, is
nowhere treated at length by commentators or translators. It is the
forgotten part of Hegels Encyclopaedia. It concerns itself with the
32. Eduard Cans (Hegel's offcial biographer), as summarized by Dyde, Preface
to HEGEL,THE PHmosopHY OF BiGHT at x (Dyde transl. 1896).
33. PR Preface at 2.
34. Sandars, op. cit. supra note 8, at 213.
35. PR Preface at 10.
36. PR Translator'sNotes at 283, 302 n.27.
37. MA-cuSF, op. cit. supra note 10, at 143; FosTra, TkE PoLmCAL PtILOSOPzlES
oF PLATO AND HECEL 150 (1935); HoBHousE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 32-33.
38. PR Preface at 10.
39. Hegel admits there are innumerable states and conditions which do not correspond to his definition in that they do not embody a unity of essence and existence,
but he dismisses them as spurious, as chance existences, and therefore not of philosophical importance or even of importance for reality itself.
40. Quoted by MAcusF, op. cit. supra note 10, at 167. Hegel never rejected the
world for ideas and considered existence a necessary part of his system. See, e.g.,
BAmmr, WHAT is EXsTENTmALIsM? 41f (1964), earlier a PATSAN REvIEw SmuEs
Two 21 (1947); see also note 21 supra.
41. The world contains the truth in itself since the negative dialectic will "unfold"
that which is within, without. See note 30 supra.
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particularization or objectification of the Idea, which now passes into
phases of time, space, and phenomenal existence. As already seen, the
Idea, which is Hegel's Absolute, necessarily unfolds from within, and
the subject-matter of our present study evolves as the synthesis
of Spirit (Geist). Thus the absolute idea is now interpreted as
objective being, so that the Logic ends where it began, with the
category of being. This is not, however, the same, but a different
being, on a higher level of understanding, and therefore one which
cannot be explained through the concepts applied in the opening
analysis of the Logic. It now is understood as a concrete totality in
which "all particular forms subsist as the essential distinctions and
relations of one comprehensive principle. Thus comprehended, being
is nature, and dialectical thought passes on to the Philosophy of
Nature.."42 In other words the Hegelian methods and procedures

utilized for the first division, or logic, are now utilized for the second
division, or nature, and this time the higher level or conclusions
reached involve the objective, rather than the subjective. But now
that an objective and a subjective, or logic and nature, are obtained,
what must occur when their oppositions, or negations, interact? This
brings us to the last of Hegers tripartite analysis.
With the third major division of the Idea, i.e., spirit, we are only
slightly concerned, for this subdivision is itself subdivided into Subjective, Objective, and Absolute Spirit.43 The Hegelian dialectic
should be sufficiently clear at this point to grasp the present method
and relationship as exhibited in and by this new tripartite division.
The Spirit is the synthesis of the Logic and the Nature, but even
as the Logic and the Nature are themselves a synthesis of other prior
evolutions, so does the Spirit partake of the like principle. Thus, to
follow the former pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, we now
find the Spirit having a similar evolution.
The Subjective Spirit is thus the "in and for itself" Spirit, treating
of the soul, of consciousness, and of the mind (the same subject,
object, and synthesis heretofore examined), the Objective Spirit being
its negative relation and evolving the Absolute Spirit therefrom. The
Objective Spirit will probably concern itself with the antithesis of
soul, consciousness, and mind (and which will likely be the external
relational manifestations which we may term institutions); through
and out of these evolves the eventual Absolute. Man now concerns
himself with these objective institutions which are simultaneously
cause and effect, -acting and acted, part and yet whole. It is these
institutions which are the particular subject-matter of our present
42. MARcusE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 165f.
43. Hegel's Geist is translatable into Spirit or Mind, but the formier is preferred.
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analysis, and it is the Philosophy of Right 4 which treats of them.

"Hence, as this work treats of an essential stage in the evolution of
spirit, whose whole nature is unfolded scene by scene in the Encyclopaedia,it is not inaccurate to speak of Hegel's ethical principles as
based upon his logic... . 45 One single thread runs through the whole
46
organism of the work."

II. TiE Pi-rLosoPay OF RiGHT CoNsm~rt=
Since the Encyclopaedia already contained Hegel's views of Right
in its relation to his system, why an expanded version? The opening
paragraph of his Preface to the Philosophy of Right states that his

pupils at Berlin required a textbook and so "This compendium is an
enlarged and especially a more systematic exposition of the same

fundamental concepts" set forth previously. 47 But Hegel nowhere
asserts the Right can be considered apart from his entire system-as a
matter of fact, he asseverates that "the nature of speculative knowing"
has been expounded in his Logic. He therefore now omits "to bring

out and demonstrate the chain of logical argument in each and every
detail" because the reader's acquaintance with philosophical method
is assumed. 48 The Right will, therefore, treat of one phase of the synthesis resulting from the Logic and the Nature; that phase will be
the objective (institutional) antithesis to the subjective thesis (Spirit).
The Right is thus to consider the world in which we live, 41 i.e.,

primarily "our" world of institutions and beliefs. So Hegel's breakdown, again tripartite, considers first Abstract Right, then Morality,."
and, finally, the Ethical Life. 51 The first subdivision is law, which

involves property, contract, and wrong; the second is conscience,
44. See note 14 supra.
45. The Hegelian system is essentially methodological but his language may have
been better chosen to express his thoughts, e.g., supra note 19. His dialectic has
a "substantial identity with the Platonic dialectic." HARRus, INTRODUcTION TO HEGEL'S
PMLOSOPMrCAL METHOD 2 (undated, Col. Univ. Lib., Class. #193 H 36-D4);
see also GRAY, op. cit. supra note 28, also referring this back to Heraclitus.
46. Dyde, op. cit. supra note 32, at xi. This is also Kuno Fischer's view. 8
GEscmCac
DER NEuREN PHmosoPmE (1901). This volume is really two volumes,
each a Part, and Part II, Bk. 11, cbs. 30-32, discuss the Philosophy of Right.
The aspect of religion is not omitted, e.g., WALL.cE, op. cit. supra note 11. See
also, supra note 13. PR 365 n.12 to par. 270.
47. PR 1, 14.
48. PR 2.
49. But not Nature, for this is examined elsewhere. The Idea is Logic, Nature,
and Spirit. The physical aspects of the world are treated in Nature. Spirit consists
of the tripartite division already discussed, with Bight involving the Objective Spirit.
If Nature were again treated in Objective Spirit it would do violence to Hegel's
system and methodology.
50. See PR 319.
51. See references cited in note 20 supra.
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treating three aspects thereof; and the third discusses the family,
civil society, and the state. It is impossible here to treat all phases
of the Right; only certain aspects in each of the first and third subdivisions will be examined, 2 namely, property, contract, punishment,
and constitutional law. First, however, Hegel's all-embracing and
important doctrine of will must be examined and understood, for all
that follows stems from it.
Hegers "introduction" states that "The subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right, i.e., the concept of right
together with the actualization of that concept."53 Prior works by
Hegel have previously discussed the logical development of this
concept so that he takes it now as given or presupposed.5 4 But what
is it, as we discuss it here? Hegel answers that "An existent of any
sort embodying the free will, this is what right is. Right therefore
is by definition freedom as Idea."55 But still, where do we find it?
"The basis of right is, in general, mind; its precise place and point
of origin is the will. The will is free, so that freedom is both the
substance of right and its goal, while the system of right is the realm
of freedom made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of
itself like a second nature."1 The will is the sine qua non of right
but it must be a free will,5 7 capable of having its potentialities become
actualized. In such actualization it simply turns backward into
itself; it becomes "the infinite in actuality (infinitum actu), since the
concept's existence or its objective externality is inwardness itself."5 8
The freely-determining will is, therefore, an active actuality which
is self-producing and self-determining; it seeks by its nature the good
and demands that its impulses be purified. 59 Where it has erred it
seeks to regain the good by expiation; where it acts contrary to the
Idea it voluntarily and joyously demands punishment.
52. The second part, abstract Morality, involving Hegels discussion of purpose and
responsibility, intention and welfare, and good and conscience, is omitted from direct
examination but it is mentioned throughout.
53. PR 14.
54. See note 47 supra.
55. PR 33.
56. PR 20. Freedom is not Hegel's alone but is found in philosophical antiquity
also; Dyde, Hegel's Conception of Freedom, 3 Pnn..OSOrMCAL REv. 655-71 (1894),
analyzes this. See also Harris, Preface to FicnT.E, ScmNCE OF EiGHTs at v., vii. (Kroeger
transl. 1889); FOsTmR, op. cit. supra note 37, at 137; LJQUEER, HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 104f (1896).
57. McVANNEI, HEEI.'s Docr= OF THE W .L 20, 37 (1896); M_ viN, op. cit.
s-upra note 2, at 48, examining the basis of Pashukanis' Commodity Exchange Theory
of Law, points up his view of a free market place with free men engaging in free
transactions as the originating point of law.
58. PR 30, 317.
59. Id. at 28.
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The will is then true, or rather truth itself, because its self-determination
consists in a correspondence between what it is in its existence (i.e., what
it is as objective to itself) and its concept; or in other words, the pure con-

cept of the will has the intuition of itself for its goal and its reality. 60

And, as Hegel concludes his Introduction, it is "In correspondence
with the stages in the development of the Idea of the absolutely
free will" that the Philosophy of Right is subdivided into, and the will
thereby examined in, the three phases of (a) immediate, i.e., an
abstract will or personality and its embodiment in "an immediate
external thing," giving the sphere of Abstract or Formal Right; (b)
"reflected from its external embodiment into itself... i.e., Morality;"
and (c) "The unity and truth of both these abstract moments ...
[the Idea given] in its absolutely universal existence . . . Ethical

Life."6 1

A. Property and Contract

From the preceding analysis the concept of legal property involves
the play and interplay of one's will. A thing is mine when my will
makes it mine, i.e., when it enters and possesses the thing so willed.
This willing is a substantive right, that is, an "absolute right of
appropriation which man has over all 'things. "62 It is with ownership that a man becomes more complete than one who owns not; in
full ownership one's liberty becomes ascendingly higher since he
Thus life is not an entirety withwills relations which entail rights. 63
out liberty, freedom, and property.
But what of a conflict between two wills? There exists what
Hegel terms "the imperative of right," that is, "Be a person and
respect others as persons." 64 To illustrate what Hegel means, the
early explorers of Antartica claimed possession and title for their
countries because no other "will" had arrived there first. And, assuming America wins the race to the moon, will (not) this jurisprudential
concept of first come-first served be followed? This factual situation
where no "will" is found present may also, by a legal fiction, be
utilized, e.g., the landings by Columbus and the Pilgrims, where the
will of the Indians was ignored (albeit the latter might be said to
have utilized preemption and prescription, while the Dutch "pur60. Id. at 31-32.
61. Id. at 35-36.
62. Id. at 41. In the United States this concept of and approach to property and
contract was dignified and protected by the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. See discussion in Foanoscs, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw chs. XV,

XVIII (1963).
63. These are protected in our own Constitution of the United States, note 56 supra,
just as in Hegel's philosophy.
64. PR. 37.
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chased" Manhattan). Or, to illustrate in a different fashion, when
the United States, whose "will" then occupied the Northwest Territory (as indicated by the Northwest Ordinance-of 1787), agreed
to open it up to the settlers in the famous Land Ordinance of 1785
and the Homestead Act of 1862 (which supplemented the PreEmption Act of 1841), as amongst themselves the homesteaders
acted on a first come-first served basis, but only because the government willed it so. As between France and the United States, however, without war there could ordinarily have been no such homesteading or territorial occupation unless both nations had previously
agreed to a sale and purchase. In other words, since my will
originally desires and freely enters a thing, it may now voluntarily
withdraw and permit another's will to enter (or merely withdraws as
by discarding an article, whereupon the law of "finder's keepers"
enters); when the other's will now enters this makes the thing his,
i.e., gives him legal title thereto. The deed or contract is the legal
evidence of this withdrawal-entering relation.65 The will, freely and
voluntarily entering and leaving a thing, is the determining factor;
and in a contract between two wills the common-law doctrine of
mutuality of agreement finds expression, for it is only when both
wills have freely and actively willed that they be bound that a
contract is then entered into.66 Here, too, the common law and

Hegel agree, but there is now given us an analytical tool of potency
and systematic utility which may be invoked when examining other
phases of the law.
In the preliminary discussions of a contract two wills freely,
actively, and voluntarily make their respective decisions and act
thereon. The essence of the will consists in just this, for the right, or
good, is sought after and, in a valid contract, makes its appearance;
when the will errs in its course the opposite occurs and it does, or
commits, a wrong. "Hegel distinguishes between Schein (show or
resemblance) and Erscheinung (appearance) .

. .

. An appearance

is a forth-shining of the reality. A show is the inessential masqueradiag as the essential, the denial of the essence in its apparent assertion."6 7 Thus, even though a show of right is made, it is not of the
65. The Anglo-Saxon and Continental (Roman) distinction is exemplified by this rule,
i.e., the writing is merely evidence as against the agreement per se.
66. But assume the law says you have contracted with X, regardless of your will
not to, because of your conduct, e.g., as in an estoppel case-is this not a contradiction
of the Hegelian doctrine? The answer is no, for as with punishment the law courts are.
merely the embodiment of'your will telling you what it is you really want and, insofar
as you refrain from entering the contract, you are negating your own will. The courts
thus will your will for you, and it is your will (through them) which really wills the
estoppel, thus willing for you the contract you would have willed in the first instance.
67. PR 329. See also PR 64.
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essence of right and such show is therefore wrong, e.g., a contract
fraud or a criminal embezzlement. "But the truth of this show is
its nullity and the fact that right reasserts itself by negating this
negation of itself. In this process the right is mediated by returning
unto itself out of the negation of itself; thereby it makes itself actual
and valid, while at the start
it was only implicity and something
68
immediate," i.e., fortuitous.

This right, in contract, "is present as something posited" as a substantive right;69 but the contract right is still a private right which,
assuming it is otherwise acceptable, is "created" by and between the
parties. It is their own personalities and, as an off-shoot of such
blending, is to be followed or enforced because that is what their
wills will. 70 To do otherwise is to do a willed wrong; but that cannot
be the will's appearance, merely a show, so that the true will, i.e.,
its appearance, disavows the aberrant show and wills its punishment
civilly, e.g., a breach of contract damage suit. In this civil punishment the truly apparent will partakes through the medium it, with all
other true wills, has previously agreed upon, i.e., a court of justice,
which is one aspect of the willed state; it thus wills its own civil
punishment.7
B. Crime and Punishment
The concepts and theories analyzed in the discussion of property
and contract are as applicable to criminal public wrongs as to civil
private wrongs. But one change or modification is required in the
formulation. It has been shown that a privately willed contractual
right becomes a posited, substantive right which the true will desires
be followed and enforced. But this cannot occur with respect to a
public right. For how can the erring will discuss beforehand with
68. Id. at 64. In the Encyclopaedia Hegel's sub-section heading is entitled "Right
versus wrong," whereas Knox's translation discloses Hegel's present heading as merely
"Wrong."
69. Id. at 60. This substantive right, e.g., as in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), is given constitutional recognition as a right to be protected from invasion
by the states. See also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and the concluding paragraphs
of Justice Black's opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
70. See FEasoN, THE R OiroAL BAsIs OF CoNrAcrsSAM RELA D PnonLMaIs nT
LEAL ANALYsIs v., 1 (1949); See also, HoLLASND, ELEmENTs oF JtuIsPnuDENcE
passim (1917); Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 IL.. L. REv.
85 (1919); Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, 48 L.J.Q.B. 577 (1879).
71. Our ex post facto constitutional limitations, U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10, and
found also in the due process clauses, recognize this principle of prior-willed rules and
principles, which are incapable of future change, unless again so willed, so as to apply
to past occurrences. Compare the current (1965) agitation in Germany to extend the
statute of limitations with respect to the prosecution of Nazi war criminals (or at least
to utilize a different method and date for calculating the time).
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the victim the right it proposes to breach, for which a self-imposed
punishment will occur. There must be, then, another and different
right, i.e., a public right as distinguished from the private right; and
for a breach of the former more onerous consequences will flow
than those attendant upon a breach of the latter. But whereas we
know the genesis of the private right, whence comes this public right?
The genesis of this public right is not in the active, free will of the
individual personality but in the "imperative of right," namely,
"Be a person and respect others as persons."7 2 In this phrase we
see the imperative looming as a duty which is over and beyond the
individual private will. This imperative follows the dialectical pattern of examining the concept of the individual will (the thesis),
analyzing its conflicts and antinomies (the antithesis), and then
mediating their reconciliation in a synthesis which is in, and yet
above, the original wills. This public imperative is not discrete and
unrelated to one's private will; it is another aspect of the going-outfrom-within-and-returning-into-itself free will of the individual. In
property this will is manifested and finds itself in the thing possessed;
in contract it fuses or combines with another; in the present instance,
however, an agreement is reached with all on a higher plane than
with one or a few.7 3 Essentially, therefore, this higher plane or will
is one's own, coming back to one's own when punishment is (self-)
inflicted. It is in this higher will that the public right is nurtured and,
through the individual's own will-participation, it becomes a right
comparable to the private right; and for a breach of this latter one
now punishes one's self by self-willing it and acting through one's
agents, i.e., the state.7 4 "The injury (penalty) which falls on the
criminal is not merely implicitly just-as just, it is eo ipso his implicit
will, an embodiment of his freedom, his right; on the contrary, it is
also a right established within the criminal himself, i.e., in his
objectively embodied will, in his action." 5
Thus, in being an individual and respecting others' individualities,
and by imposing punishment upon one's self and thereafter insisting
and assisting in carrying out such punishment, the transgressor is
given the dignity of a moral and rational individual. 6 Flechtheim's
72. PR 37.
73. Compare Rousseau's general will, and Locke's social contract, which are analogous
to but distinguishable from Hegel's doctrine.
74. In Hegelian theory alone we may contrast this exposition with that given by the
Moscow Bolshevik, Issue No. 4, 1947, as quoted by General Walter Bedell in his
Memoirs, Installment 7, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1949.
75. PR 70. See, e.g., Shuchman, supra note 1, at 27, 30, 32; WATsoN, ComrE,
MILL, AND SPENcER 229-30 (1895). See further the language of the majority in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
76. Hegel's approach runs contrary to principles historically espoused, namely,
retribution and deterrent. See, e.g., discussion in Shuehman, supra note 1, and discussion
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historical analysis of the basis for and problem of punishment in
Hegel's dialectical integration holds that "Hegel overreaches himself"77 in that "such a conception can hardly make room for future

development,"7a and concludes that Hegel's philosophy forces him
"to glorify [punishment] as a reasonable and emancipating force."1
Hegel's approach is not, however, completely at odds with modem
techniques of treating criminals, e.g., parole, rehabilitation, and probation. The latest authoritative German criminal code agrees basically
with Anglo-American law in its retributive and deterrent approach,
but it does not overlook parole as a means of hastening expiation.
And yet, what is this approach if not a recognition of intrinsic goodness and human dignity? Does not this aspect partake somewhat
of the Hegelian doctrine of the will, its freedom, and its self-punishing "mechanism?"8 0 And to the extent that the latest re-formulation
of the American Law Institute's model code desires to let private
conduct, not impinging upon the public, remain the concern of private
wills, does this not follow the Hegelian approach?
There still remains the question what this public right consists
of, for a violation of which punishment follows. Merely pointing
out how it arises does not give us its content. It is at this stage that
those who deride "What is rational is actual and what is actual is
rational,"81 have their inning. For Hegel must give substance to
the claimed public right; he therefore ventures, in the second part
of his Philosophy of Right, into the field of Morality where he discusses Good and Conscience, finally passing from morality to Ethical
Life.82 This middle part of his essay gives us, albeit inconclusively,
the theoretical content of the public right, which now is defined as
"the good become alive."83 Briefly stated, the objective ethical order,
which replaces the good in the abstract, "is substance made concrete
by subjectivity as infinite form." 84 The country's laws and institutions, substantive in character, are duties binding the will of the
individual who is related to them as to the substance of his own
being.8 The right of all individuals to be subjectively destined to
freedom is thus fulfilled when they belong to an actual ethical
of Burke's thoughts in Kmu, THE CONSEmVAIVE MIND 5, 9, 68, 74 (1960).
77. Flechtheim, Hegel and the Problem of Punishment, 8 J. Hisony OF IDEAS 293308, (1947).
78. Id. at 296.
79. Ibid.
80. Id. at 298.
81. PR 10.
82. Id. at 103.
83. Id. at 105.
84. Ibid.
85. Id. at 106.
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order. 86 This, *in short, is Hegels glorification of existing institutions
which, if accepted, apparently prevents change -or experiment.
C. Constitutional Law
The series of transitional steps just adumbrated brings ius from
the first part of the Philosophy of Right into the third. Hegel believes
that the "ethical substance" is to be found as "the actual mind of a
family and a nation." 87 These become the focal points of his concluding analysis. In this discussion of constitutional law we close
the still-open question of how the substance of the preceding indestructible 8 public right is made known and "enforced."
The freely-acting will is now the basis of this phase of Right, as it
has been in property, contract, and civil and criminal punishment.
Here the subjective will recognizes as valid that which it sees as good
and, acting objectively in accordance with this knowledge, commits
a right or wrong, legal or illegal, act.8 9 But this "right of insight
into the good is distinct from the right of insight in respect of action
as such;" 90 and, since any action is an alteration taldng place in an
actual 9' world (thus obtaining recognition therein), "it must in
general accord with what has validity there. Whoever wills to act
in this world of actuality has eo ipso submitted himself to its laws
and recognized the right of objectivity."92
In other words, the free will, by the very nature of its essence,
must reify itself, thereby recognizing and submitting to that which
has "validity" in such objective sphere. Or,.put differently, there can
be no free will outside of (not in relation with) its own objectivity,
i.e., they are coin-faces. Actuality (objectivity) is thus subjectivity,
and subjectivity is objectivity (actuality). Which must mean that the
willed actuality, being the good and rational will objectifying itself, is
either a reflection of, or the alter ego of, the Absolute come to life. 93
What is this Absolute objectified? "The principle of rightness passes
over in civil society into law. My individual right, whose embodiment has hitherto been immediate and abstract, now similarly be86. Id. at 109.
87. Id. at 110.
88. Flechtheim, supra note 77, at 300.
89. PR 87.
90. Id. at 88.
91. Hegel's meaning of actual or actuality is found in citations in note 36 supra.
92. PR 88. In modem civilization there is no "willing" of one's self into this world
for one is born into it, into a society, into a group. Perhaps by acceptance, or- waiver,
or estoppel, one "wills" to remain.
93. Thesd conblusi6ns enmesh us with--natural law doctrines and while Hegel did not
overlook this, PR 224, he did not treat it at length; he could make no distinction
between natural and positive rights. McVANNEL, op. cit. supra note 54,. at 71.
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comes embodied in the existent will and knowledge of everyone, in
the sense that it becomes recognized."- The Absolute is thus now
the law, that is, the legal institutions and rules of conduct known,
recognized, and obeyed by al.15 For "if laws are to have a binding
force . . . they must be made universally known;"6 being thus
known and recognized they must be obeyed; for "wrongdoing now
becomes an infringement, not merely of what is subjectively infinite,
but of the universal thing which is existent with inherent stability
and strength."97 Criminal punishment is thus self-willed 9 for it is
an infraction of the will's own Absolutes, which are found objectified
in such laws and customs. The court of justice is merely the objective
instrumentality of the will's own will; the jury condemning the
criminal is likewise his own will9 objectifying itself so as to set the
wheels of justice in motion; and the will thus wills itself to punish
itself.
All this stems from the will objectifying and embodying itself in
these laws and institutions which are the Absolute on earth; and these
provide the basis for, as well as the actual content of, the public
right which must not be violated. Whence come these laws and
institutions which form the content of the public right? Obviously
from a prince, a monarch, a state-from some authority which does
not represent the will of each of us but is the wills of all and the will
of each. For Hegel it is the state which is "the actuality of the
ethical Idea," "the actuality of concrete freedom," and which exists
"immediately in custom"; it "is absolutely rational," 100 so that the
"Idea of the state (a) has immediate actuality and is the individual
state as a self-dependent organism-the Constitution or Constitutional
Law; (b) passes over into the relation of one state to other statesInternational Law; (c) is the universal Idea as a genus and as an
absolute power over individual states-the mind which gives itself
its actuality in the process of World-History."101 The state is thus
made the new basis for Hegel's dialectical analysis and is three-fold
examined as before, with Constitutional Law being made the thesis
out of whose contradictions the eventual synthesis of World-History
will flow. This relational-identification of will and Absolute, of state
and Idea, and of law and constitution, binds the ones into the many
and the total into the Absolute. The constitution is therefore the
94. PR 139.
95. See HEGEL, PHmosoPHY oF HISTORY (Sibree transl. 1900).

96. PR 138.
97. Id. at 140.
98. CA NG, op. cit. supra note 8, at 19.
099. PR 285. See also PR 165; REYBuRN, op. cit. supranote 16, at 214, 215, 220.
100. PR 155.
101. Id. 160. See SADArts, op. cit. supra note 8,, at 241.
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rational expressioii of the ethical Idea and its objective existence
is a necessary aspect of the free will, e.g., we may say with Locke
that the Constitution of the United States was entered into by free
wills acting collectively against one who had willed himself out of
the original relationship. This, of course, presents the next question
for Hegel, 'Vho is to frame the constitution"? 102
Hegel feels this question to be meaningless since it presupposes
that only an agglomeration of individuals is present who, amongst
themselves, now create a constitution, e.g., Rousseau's general will,
or the Mayflower Compact. Since his concept has nothing to do with
an agglomeration then the question of how it, the agglomeration,
could acquire a constitution, "it would have to be allowed to settle
for itself ...."-103 But if we presuppose an existing constitution then
our original question really becomes, Who is to alter the constitution?
This assumes amendment by constitutional means only.
In any case, however, it is absolutely essential that the constitution should
not be regarded as something made, even though it has come into being
in time. It must be treated rather as something simply existent in and by
itself, as divine therefore, and constant, and so as exalted above the sphere
of things that are made.104

This constitution, "existent in and by itself," is internally rational

and is the organization of the state. The necessity for a division of
state powers is a point "of the highest importance and, if taken in
its true sense, may rightly be regarded as the guarantee of public
freedom."105 The three powers Hegel speaks of are the legislature,
the executive, and the Crown; 106 the last binds these different powers
"into an individual unity" of constitutional monarchy which "is the
achievement of the modern world . ...107 This exaltation of constitutional monarchy as the only true form in which a state can attain
its perfection is the most unique and characteristic part of Hegels
theory of a state. 10 8 He not only makes the prince the be-all and the
102. PR 178.
103. Ibid. See also PR 179.
104. Id. at 178. May we ask, parenthetically, whether Hegel was influenced in anr
degree by the unwritten constitution of the English, althbugh he says it is an "idle
question" to ask which is a better form of government, monarchy or democracy.
PR 268.
105. Id. at 175. When Hegel speaks of "a division of powers within the State,"
Knox gives his own reference as " A caidinal .point in Montesquieu," PR 367, and upon
which see the American concepts also. FoRPoscm op. cit. supra note 56, chs. I, IH.
106. PR 176, differing, however, from the American form which involves a degree
of independence. See also MAncusE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 219.
107. PR 176. See also , CUNNINGHA , THouGr AND' Ezixiy IN HEGaLs SsTEm'
130 (1910).
108. Sandars,,supra note 8, at 244.
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end-all of the state'019 but makes him "raised to the dignity of
monarchy in an immediate, natural, fashion, i.e., through his birth
in the course of nature."" 0
It is at this point that Hegers doctrine of free will breaks down.
While it is an excellent starting tool to investigate his closed system,"'
free will is now dispensed with and acceptance because of statement, authority, or belief is substituted. Assuming that free will
is "proved" and therefore is logically acceptable, Hegel's Greater
Logic" 2 nowhere permits logical insertion" 3 of a constitutional
monarchy in his Philosophy of Right. Examination of property, contract, punishment, and law permits a logical development from the
will of one or all; but what umbilical cord maintains life in this
potentate?" 4 Of course the freely acting will of all may conceive
him, but conception is not continued life or actual birth; then what
becomes of Hegel's admission that a constitution's "alteration may
come about only by constitutional means?"" 5 For alteration implies
change with no eventual limitation, but here is foisted" 6 a concept
of such inalienability that no freely willing people can escape its
crushing impact.
What Hobhouse has termed a "false and wicked doctrine" 7 may
be, instead, labelled a series of conclusions which are false to their
premises, illogical in their synthesis, and therefore wicked to the free
will of their author. For if a free will desires the good end, which
is a logical end or culmination or synthesis, then in at least this one
instance of constitutional monarchy and a prince Hegel errs against
himself-which means the free will acts against its own precepts and
therefore should castigate itself. How? Apparently by removing the
canker presently impeding the will's free actions. A constitutional
government there must be but not a constitutional monarchy which is
ruled simply by divine right of birth. And if the state, so-called,
represents the will of all, even of those who deny it by show of
109. PR 179.
110. Id. at 184.
111. REYBunN, op. cit. supra note 16, at xii, feels there is no starting point to
Hegel's closed system.
112. See note 11, supra; MeTAGcAnT, A CoMmNTARY oN HWEL.'s LoGic 2 (1910),
terming it the Greater Logic because it encompasses "a complete system of philosophy."
113. See BAreLY, op. cit. supra note 18, at x.
114. E.g., compare the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952).
115. PR 178.
116. E.g., Wmcrr, A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILosopny 317 (1941).

117. Supra note 5. Tocqueville felt that Hegel's required submission to established
facts as legitimate created a Pandora's box from which "have escaped all sorts of moral
diseases from which the people is still suffering." Quoted by Zetterbaum, Tocquevile:
Neutrality and the Use of History, 58 Am. POL. ScrLRav. 611, 619 (1964).
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hands, i.e., the dissenters, that self-same will may then alter and
amend without hindrance of the illogical concept inserted by Hegel.The question of making known its day-to-day decisions is a problem not within our scope; but the road-block in the Philosophy of
Right has been removed; this permits us to consider alternative forks
which lie ahead.
As opposed to Hegers dislike of "people," whom he thinks of
"only as an aggregate, a formless mass whose commotion and activity
could therefore only be elementary, irrational, barbarous, and frightful,"" 8 may be proposed Jefferson's concepts, or those of others, all
equally as logical. Hegels belief that the state should exercise control" 9 over these antagonisms is predicated upon two concepts, both
of which the American Constitution rejects: (1) that the people cannot be trusted whereas a monarch can; and (2) that constitutional
monarchy is the ultinate in political dialectics (instead of a phase
or stage in the world-history of a particular time). 120
As corollaries of his beliefs Hegel must, and does, logically conclude
that "War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely
external accident" but, rather, as "a necessisty." 12' Further, that
"Sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is the substantial
tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal
duty."1 But, as has been heretofore demonstrated, while all these
are logical as deductions from premises, the assumptions from which
they are drawn are not themselves logically deduced as in a sorites,
and so all that follows is fallacious. For example, since logically
there can be no impairment of the powers of the prince, else he is
not the supreme authority, there can be no international law per se,
which involves such impairment, nor can there be valid, circumscribing treaties. Since nations "are in a state of nature, they act
according to violence. They maintain and procure their rights
through their own power and must as a matter of necessity plunge
into war."m The logic is irresistible, but who created a prince? Who
defines his powers? Who acts as he wills? And who bears -the brunt
118. PR 198.
op. cit. supra note 18, at 14-16, discussing the "rooted antithesis
119. BAmiEL,
between Kant's theory of the supreme worth of the individual will and purpose, and
the Greek ideal of the "limitation of the individual for and by the universal end of the
State." Hegel built upon both. See, however, HwuL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 17;
PR 2.
120. See, e.g., John Dewey's language in 9 ENCYCLOPEDA Soc. Sci. 602. See also

KNox,

THE AEsTHEc THEoRmS OF KANT, HEos,, AND SCHoPENHAuRt
MACKINTOSH, HEGEL Am HEGELIANMm 211 (1913).

109 (1936);

121. PR 209.
122. Id. at 210. See also BALL.E, op. cit. supra note 18, at 9-13.
123. PInosopsasCu PnoPADEumnx, I, § 31, quoted by MAncuss, op. cit. supra note
10, at 222.
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of his errors? Whereas a prince cannot be limited, why permit
individuals so to be? The free will doctrine is emasculated of vitality
when Hegel leaps onto a foundation of quicksand intuition.
Although in his analysis of constitutional law Hegel substitutes
error and intuition for logic and reason, with the free will necessarily
going astray, his prior methodology is logically infallible, based upon
its premises, and provides an excellent tool for an investigation into
the bases and application of property, contract, criminal, and constitutional law.

